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C ER TIO R A R I -  SPEAKING O R D E R  -  ER R O R  O F LA W  O N  
FACE O F  R E C O R D
This ease raises an interesting point in administrative law. It 
clears the air surrounding the prerogative writ of certiorari. It should 
also case the minds of people who regard the modern trend of sub- 
delegation to inferior tribunals as dangerous to liberty. From many 
of these boards there is no appeal and prior to this case there was 
doubt whether a superior court could use the writ of certiorari in any 
more than a supervisory capacity to determine whether the board had 
exceeded its jurisdiction. ITiat the scope of review is broader than 
this now seems clear.
T he applicant, a clerk to a joint hospital board had been com­
pensated bv the Gosforth Urban District Council for loss of employ­
ment, and being dissatisfied appealed to the compensation tribunal 
which upheld the award. He moved in the divisional court of the 
King's Bench Division for an order of certiorari to remove the decision 
into the High court on the ground of an error of law on the face 
of the record; this error allegedly consisted in a failure by the board 
to take into account his service with the hospital board as it ought to 
have done under the National Health Service (transfer of officers and 
compensation) Regulations, 1948. It was adm itted in the High Court 
that the decision was wrong, but it was submitted even assuming the 
error appeared on the face of the record, that the tribunal had acted 
within its jurisdiction and that therefore the superior court lacked 
power to issue the writ. 'H ie Divisional Court however made the 
order and the tribunal appealed.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal holding that cer­
tiorari does lie, not only where an inferior tribunal exceeds its jurisdic­
tion, but also where an error of law appears on the face of the record.
T he court applied R. v. N at bell Liquors, Ltd. (1922) 2 A.C. 
128; Singleton, L.J. quoted Lord Sumner as follows; “that the superior 
court should be bound by the record is inherent in the nature of the 
case. Its jurisdiction is to see that the inferior court has not exceeded 
its own, and for that very reason it is bound not to interfere in what 
has been done within that jurisdiction, for in so doing it would itself, 
in turn, transgress the limits within which its own jurisdiction of super­
vision, not of review, is confined. T hat supervision goes to two points; 
one is the area of the inferior jurisdiction and the qualifications and 
conditions of its exercise; the other is the observance of the law in the 
coursc of its exercise.” He goes on to say that Lord Sumner showed 
how, and why, certiorari fell into disuse in the case of convictions 
before magistrates, yet there was no alteration in the law as to certiorari. 
And so it appeared to him that in cases such as the one before the 
court ccrtiorari would lie if there was an error on the face of the 
proceedings.
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Lord Justicc Denning’s judgement contains an erudite dis­
sertation on the history and application of certiorari in nearly all 
fields: conviction by magistrates, orders of justices, statutory tribunals, 
and arbitrator’s awards. Following this review lie says; “ ....the court 
of Kino’s Bench has an inherent jurisdiction to control all inferior 
tribunals, not in an appellate capacity, but in a supervisory capacity. 
This control extends not only to seeing that the inferior tribunals keep 
within their jurisdiction, but also to seeing that they observe the law. 
The control is cxcrcised by means of a power to quash any determina­
tion bv a tribunal which, 011 the face of it, offends against the law. 
T he King’s Bench docs not substitute its own views for those of the 
tribunal, as a court of appeal would do. It leaves it to the tribunal 
to hear the case again, and in proper ease may command it to do so. 
W hen the King’s Bench cxcrciscs its control over tribunals in this way, 
it is not usurping a jurisdiction which docs not belong to it. It is 
only exorcising a jurisdiction which it alwavs had.”
Lord Justice Morris summarizes the law in these words: "Cases 
were cited in argument before us which showed that in times past 
certiorari lay where justices recorded decisions which were 011 the face 
of them bad in law. It was said, however, that this was not shown to 
have been the practicc in the ease of non-judicial tribunals. But 
there is no warrant for the view that the controlling power exercised 
by certiorari over inferior courts varies according to tlie description of, 
or the composition of, the inferior court. Once the body concerned 
is properly , to be described as an inferior court in the sense in which 
this expression is now well understood, then, subject to any statutory 
provision, an order of ccrtiorari will issue 011 any of the grounds 
recognized bv law. It was further said that, though these grounds were 
formerly wide enough to include eases where decisions were, 011 the 
face of them, bad in law, there has in recent years been a contraction, 
with the result that certiorari 110 longer lies for such reason. It is said 
that this basis for the cxcrcisc of the controlling power has fallen into 
abevancc. I can find 110 justification for this contention.”
There is surely wisdom in the words of Singleton, L. J. who 
savs in speaking of the lack of appeals to the courts from many of these 
tribunals: “ I most earnestly wish in such eases, where difficult questions 
of law, and of interpretation, must arise, that there should foe given 
some right of appeal. After all, it is the function of the courts to 
determine questions of law. Tribunals are sometimes given an unduly 
difficult task. There must be a feeling of dissatisfaction if it is rec­
ognized that a decision of a tribunal is wrong in law and vet there 
is 110 power to correct it. I am satisfied that the course I have 
suggested would result in a saving of time, and of expense, and would 
be for the public good.”
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